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Abstract
Histories of  equal rights for women in international law normally begin with post-World War 
II initiatives. Such an approach leaves out two treaties signed at the 1933 Montevideo Pan-
American Conference, the Equal Nationality Treaty and the Equal Rights Treaty, which remain 
forgotten among international lawyers. By reconstructing their inception and intellectual back-
ground, this article aims to raise awareness about debates on international law among feminist 
activists in the interwar years. In turn, the focus on activist work allows for the recovery of  the 
contribution of  women to the development of  the discipline in that seminal period, a contribu-
tion usually obfuscated by men’s predominance in diplomatic and academic roles. By outlining 
the contribution of  two key promoters of  the Montevideo treaties – Doris Stevens and Alice Paul 
of  the National Woman’s Party – the article takes a step towards the re-inclusion of  women’s 
rights activists within the shared heritage of  international law and its history.
1 Introduction
Feminist approaches have been appearing in the mainstream of  international legal 
scholarship for some time.1 Also, in the last two decades, a wealth of  historical works 
* Post-Doctoral Researcher, Centre of  Excellence in Law, Identity and the European Narratives (EuroStorie), 
University of  Helsinki, Finland. Email: paolo.amorosa@helsinki.fi. The Centre of  Excellence in Law is 
funded by the Academy of  Finland (Funding Decision no. 312154).
1 A seminal event in this respect was the publication in 1991 of  Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright, 
‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’, 85 American Journal of  International Law (AJIL) (1991) 
613. For a later appraisal of  the influence of  the article and its arguments, see the series of  comments 
published in October 2012 on the blog IntLawGrrls, available at www.intlawgrrls.com/search/label/
feminism%20series.
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has appeared, enormously increasing our knowledge and understanding of  this dis-
cipline’s past. Nevertheless, the earliest international treaties prescribing equal rights 
for women, signed in 1933 at the Montevideo Pan-American Conference, have not 
received attention in publications by international lawyers.2 Even in texts dedicated 
to the international evolution of  women’s rights, the Equal Nationality Treaty and 
the Equal Rights Treaty rarely obtain a mention.3 In terms of  interwar treaty achieve-
ments, commentators normally point only to the protective measures creating spe-
cial regimes for women, such as the conventions against their trafficking, adopted 
under the aegis of  the League of  Nations, and the International Labour Organization 
conventions, which prescribe limitations to what can be asked of  women in terms of  
working conditions.
It is only with accounts of  the inception of  the Charter of  the United Nations that 
the first mention of  international agreements based on an egalitarian approach, 
rather than a protective one, appear. Often, the lobbying of  women delegates and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) gets credited with the prescription of  non-
discrimination on the grounds of  sex enshrined in Article 1(3) of  the UN Charter and 
the recognition of  equal rights between men and women in its preamble. Sometimes, 
the main institutional sponsor of  the Montevideo treaties, the Inter-American 
Commission on the Status of  Women, is mentioned among these women’s rights or-
ganizations. Yet neither the treaties nor the commission’s earlier activity find space in 
international lawyers’ accounts, notwithstanding the scant record of  women’s rights 
in interwar international law.
To be sure, there could be valid reasons explaining and justifying the choice to ex-
clude the treaties from works on the protection of  the international protection of  
women’s rights. First, there is the economy of  most of  the relevant texts; focused 
on the current content of  international law on the subject, they are introduced by 
a necessarily skeletal historical survey. Second, one of  the treaties – the Equal Rights 
Treaty – never received the necessary ratifications and, therefore, never entered into 
force, which, in itself, would be an obvious criterion to exclude a treaty from any de-
scription of  the positive international law regarding the protection of  women’s rights. 
Third, even the treaty that entered into force – the Equal Nationality Treaty – had an 
obvious regional, rather than global, scope. Nevertheless, this circumstance has not 
prevented other instruments that were approved at the Montevideo Conference, such 
as the Convention on the Rights and Duties of  Nations, from gaining a prominent 
place in the canon of  international law.4
2 This is not the case with scholars of  women’s history. See, e.g., D.E. Hill, ‘International Law for Women’s 
Rights’ (1999) (PhD dissertation on file at the University of  California, Berkeley); C.  Bredbenner, A 
Nationality of  Her Own: Women, Marriage and the Law of  Citizenship (1998), at 233–238.
3 Convention on the Nationality of  Women (Equal Nationality Treaty), 26 December 1933, reprinted in 
‘Seventh International Conference of  American States – Final Act’, 28 AJIL, Supplement (1934) 62; 
Equal Rights Treaty, 26 December 1933, reprinted in Scott, ‘The Seventh International Conference of  
American States’, 28 AJIL (1934) 219, at 221.
4 Convention on the Rights and Duties of  Nations, 26 December 1933, reprinted in ‘Seventh International 
Conference of  American States – Final Act’, 28 AJIL, Supplement (1934) 75.
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Whatever the reasons for these treaties’ oblivion among international lawyers to 
date, the aim of  this article is to signal their existence to scholars of  the discipline. 
Hopefully, in turn, this effort will encourage their inclusion in future studies and in-
spire further explorations. My motivation is not limited to providing information on 
legislative texts that represented a novelty for international law. I see the Montevideo 
treaties as a key product of  the early reflection on the role of  feminist advocacy for 
women’s rights in international institutions, marked by the confrontation between 
equal rights and protective approaches. This article narrates the inception of  the 
treaties and the campaign towards their signing through the agency of  two US leaders 
of  the equal rights camp, Doris Stevens (1888–1963) and Alice Paul (1885–1977). 
By providing an account of  their thought and actions, I aim to participate in the re-
writing of  women’s contribution to the history of  interwar international law, a task 
that has been undertaken only occasionally by international legal scholars to date.5
Both Stevens and Paul had discovered and joined the suffrage movement in college. 
Already during her studies at Oberlin between 1906 and 1911, Stevens had defined 
the political goal of  her life in a single sentence: ‘Same rules for girls and boys.’6 In 
turn, Paul immediately connected her feminism with the strong egalitarian ethos of  
her Quaker religious background. Together, they rose to prominence as young fem-
inist leaders in the final push of  the suffrage struggle, eventually orchestrating the 
foundation of  the National Woman’s Party (NWP) in 1916.7 Paul conceived the war-
time picketing protest of  the White House, which led to the imprisonment of  several 
party members, including her and Stevens. Stevens would write a successful account 
of  that experience in a book she titled Jailed for Freedom.8 Their actions proved crucial 
to maintaining women’s suffrage on the political agenda. This was no common feat; 
suffrage was an issue that lawmakers had traditionally brushed off. It should have 
been even easier for them to continue doing so at a time when World War I and the 
later establishment of  a new global order at Versailles could have easily suffocated any 
other concern. Yet, by 1920, the 19th Amendment to the US Constitution had been 
ratified, and women could vote nationwide.
This opened a new phase for the women’s rights movement, an assorted coalition 
that had retained – until then – a semblance of  unity thanks to the common goal of  
suffrage. During the early 1920s, Paul crafted a new agenda for the NWP, built around 
the achievement of  equal rights through the elimination of  legal rules discriminating 
5 As remarkable exceptions, I can point to the article authored by Christine Chinkin and Karen Knop on 
Chrystal Macmillan (Chinkin and Knop, ‘Remembering Chrystal Macmillan: Women’s Equality and 
Nationality in International Law’, 22 Michigan Journal of  International Law (2000–2001) 523) and to 
Part 3 of  Knop’s book Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (2002), describing the activ-
ities of, among others, peace activist Jane Addams and international lawyer Sarah Wambaugh, who was 
recognized as the foremost global expert on the plebiscites at the time.
6 D. Stevens, ‘Autobiographical Jottings’, Folder 251, Box 8, Doris Stevens Papers, Schlesinger Library, 
Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
7 On their suffrage activity, see, e.g., C.  Lunardini, Alice Paul: Equality for Women (2013); M.K. Trigg, 
Feminism as Life’s Work (2014).
8 D. Stevens, Jailed for Freedom (1920).
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on the basis of  sex, including the protective ones championed by other feminist organ-
izations. The treaties eventually signed at Montevideo represented a concrete expres-
sion of  the internationalization of  the NWP’s egalitarian project, a move favoured by 
the cooperation that Stevens and Paul began with international lawyer James Brown 
Scott (1866–1943) in the late 1920s.9 Indeed, the two treaties had a different scope 
of  application and enjoyed a different measure of  support within the larger women’s 
rights movement, but both responded to the basic philosophy that consistently in-
formed the work of  the NWP leaders: to have legal rules that would not distinguish 
between sexes in any way.
As this article shows, the NWP-led campaign promoting the Montevideo treaties 
was the earliest sustained effort to affirm the equality of  women and men through 
international law. It constitutes an ideal antecedent to the better-known lobbying ac-
tion of  women’s rights activists in the context of  the creation of  the United Nations, 
furthering our understanding of  early feminist approaches to the discipline.
2 The NWP in the 1920s: From Suffrage to Equal Rights
The NWP had represented a minimal portion of  the suffrage movement in terms of  
the number of  members. Nonetheless, it had managed to achieve results and prom-
inence beyond its size because of  the dramatic and radical nature of  its methods. This 
same militant attitude had made the NWP’s membership particularly heterogeneous. 
Alongside a liberal and bourgeois core, it attracted women from the working class, the 
political left and black communities.10 The new direction that Alice Paul and her close 
collaborators pushed towards11 would further reduce and reshape the membership of  
the party.12 In July 1920, just before the ratification of  the 19th Amendment, Paul had 
already found the new goal in ‘the passage of  a blanket enactment to remove all dis-
criminations against women in existing legislation’.13 This was the practical meaning 
that the NWP leadership had given to women’s full equality with men. It was only at 
the party’s convention, in February 1921, that the exclusive and exclusionary nature 
of  the endeavour became evident to its later opponents.
9 Scott had been a key founder of  the American Society of  International Law in 1906 and the main legal 
advisor at the State Department between 1906 and 1911. Since 1910, he had been one of  the leaders 
of  the generously funded Carnegie Endowment of  International Peace (CEIP), directing its resources to 
support a series of  projects he favoured, including, after meeting Stevens, the advocacy of  international 
equal rights for women. Generally on Scott, see P. Amorosa, ‘The American Project and the Politics of  
History: James Brown Scott and the Origins of  International Law’ (2018) (PhD dissertation on file at the 
University of  Helsinki), available at https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/233591.
10 About the attractiveness of  the early National Woman’s Party (NWP) for women of  the labour move-
ment, see Cott, ‘Feminist Politics in the 1920s: The National Woman’s Party’, 71 Journal of  American 
History (1984) 43, at 43–44; Trigg, supra note 7, at 54, 56. On the reasons black women favoured the 
NWP’s approach to the suffrage struggle, see Cott (at 50).
11 On Paul’s authoritarian leadership style, see Cott, supra note 10, at 45.
12 At the height of  the suffrage struggle, the NWP had between 35,000 and 60,000 members. During the 
1920s, the membership never exceeded 10,000 (see ibid., at 55).
13 Quoted in Geidel, ‘The National Woman’s Party and the Origins of  the Equal Rights Amendment’, 42 The 
Historian (1980) 557, at 562.
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In the lead-up to the event, Mary White Ovington, a white socialist who had been 
a founding member of  the National Association for the Advancement of  Colored 
People, stressed the importance of  including a black woman as a speaker. The black 
vote was violently suppressed in the South. As an organization devoted to equal suf-
frage, Ovington argued, the NWP should take up the issue. Emma Wold denied the 
request on behalf  of Paul:
Wold … explained that the convention could give the podium only to groups with legislative pro-
grams for women or with feminist aims. … Since Mary C. Talbert of  the National Association of  
Colored Women’s Clubs, the speaker whom Ovington recommended, represented a group with 
a ‘racial’, not ‘feminist’, intent, she could not be featured. … She encouraged the appointment 
of  black delegates who could speak from the floor.14
The rights of  black women were just the first issue to be sacrificed on the altar of  
equality. At the convention, a minority report argued for the party to turn towards 
pacifism and disarmament. Crystal Eastman, a socialist lawyer, presented a more ar-
ticulated programme of  reforms to liberate women, spanning from birth control and 
sexual morality to marriage, divorce and inheritance.15 Both proposals were voted 
down. Notwithstanding the vocal protests by Eastman and others about the undemo-
cratic attitude of  the NWP’s leadership, the majority resolution, embracing the pro-
gramme of  removing women’s legal disabilities, had the genuine support of  most 
delegates.16 The outcome prompted defections and criticism by left-wing members. 
Addressing merely legal disabilities, ‘felt chiefly by women of  property’, could not get 
‘women … liberated’ as it failed to ‘get at the root of  the matter’. Others complained 
that the newly instated higher membership fees turned the NWP into ‘a conservative, 
property-holding, upper-crust group’, an ‘aristocratic affair’.17
Still, the initial action of  the NWP towards equality legislation was not as uncom-
promising as it would later become, with instances of  social feminists who cham-
pioned protective measures. The NWP’s leaders scoured state codes for rules based on 
sex discrimination and drafted a model blanket bill to be introduced in state legisla-
tures. The model bill listed six legislative areas where inequality was to be addressed, 
but it also contained a safeguard clause for protective legislation. As Paul explained 
early in the campaign to the Massachusetts NWP chairperson, she did not ‘want to 
interfere in any way with the so called welfare legislation … protecting women from 
night work and from too long hours of  labor, even though this legislation may not be 
equal for men and women’.18 Indeed, the Equal Rights Bill championed by the NWP 
and passed by the Wisconsin legislature in June 1921 preserved the ‘special protection 
14 Cott, supra note 10, at 51.
15 For the text of  Crystal Eastman’s resolution and her criticism of  Paul’s post-suffrage ‘normalization’, see 
Eastman, ‘Alice Paul’s Convention’, 37 The Liberator (April 1921) 9, at 9–10.
16 See Cott, supra note 10, at 48–49; Geidel, supra note 13, at 565–566.
17 Quotations are taken from NWP members; quoted in Cott, supra note 10, at 49. On the convention and 
the criticism directed at it, see also S.D. Becker, The Origins of  the Equal Rights Amendment: American 
Feminism between the Wars (1981), at 17–18.
18 Cott, supra note 10, at 56.
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and privileges which [women] now enjoy for the general welfare’. The bill also fol-
lowed closely the model list, providing ‘women’ with ‘the same rights … as men in the 
exercise of  suffrage, freedom of  contract, choice of  residence for voting purposes, jury 
service, holding office, holding and conveying property, care and custody of  children 
and in all other respects’.19
By the autumn, Paul had changed her position: ‘I do not believe in special protective 
labor legislation for women. … I think that enacting labor laws along sex lines is erect-
ing another handicap for women in the economic struggle.’20 This shift, according to 
historian Nancy Cott, was likely a result of  the influence that Gail Laughlin had had 
on Paul.21 Laughlin, a lawyer from Maine, as chair of  the NWP Lawyers Committee 
began producing draft bills, including a federal amendment, without a safeguard 
clause. Going forward, the positions of  both the NWP and social feminists became 
more rigid and antithetical, especially after a failed attempt at a compromise between 
disagreeing women’s organizations in December 1921.22 During the course of  1922, a 
score of  prominent figures and associations, including the National League of  Women 
Voters (NLWV),23 came out unequivocally with their opposition to blanket equal rights 
bills.24 At the same time, Laughlin took the lead in quashing all remaining dissenting 
voices within the NWP. Her legal reasoning was two-fold. First, the proposed equal 
rights legislation would not give freedom of  contract a wider space of  application than 
it already had under the US Constitution and the statutes in force. Second, it was the 
protective legislation, and not freedom of  contract, that was preventing women from 
competing in the job market. ‘If  women can be segregated as a class for special legis-
lation under any line’, Laughlin’s argument went, ‘the same classification can be used 
for special restrictions along any other line which may, at any time, appeal to the ca-
price or prejudice of  our legislatures’. It was this legislation treating women as a class 
that was threatening to stop ‘the advancement of  women in business and industry’ 
and consign them ‘to the lowest worst paid labor’.25
Accordingly, in April 1923, Equal Rights, the NWP’s journal, applauded the deci-
sion of  the US Supreme Court in the case Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.26 Upholding its 
1905 judgment in Lochner v. New York, the Court voided a District of  Columbia law 
mandating a minimum wage for women and children as a violation of  freedom of  
contract.27 Yet, it was exactly this exclusive focus on the elimination of  legal discrim-
ination based on sex that allowed NWP members to claim they were actual feminists 
while their opponents were just reformers.28 In addition to the single-issue focus, the 
19 1921 Wisconsin Act, ch. 529, Wisconsin Session Laws of  1921, at 869.
20 Quoted in Cott, supra note 10, at 57.
21 See ibid.
22 On this meeting, see ibid., at 57–58; Geidel, supra note 13, at 570.
23 The National League of  Women Voters (NLWV) was the successor to the largest suffrage organization in 
the USA, the National American Woman Suffrage Association.
24 See, e.g., Geidel, supra note 13, at 572–574.
25 Quoted in Cott, supra note 10, at 59.
26 See ibid., at 62. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 US 525 (1923).
27 Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
28 See, e.g., the quote in Becker, supra note 17, at 171.
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NWP soon returned to another feature of  the victorious suffrage campaign: the pri-
mary, if  not exclusive, insistence on a federal amendment. Indeed, besides the victory 
in Wisconsin, the NWP state campaigns for blanket equality bills or elimination of  
specific discriminatory rules had achieved little or no success. In July 1923, Paul an-
nounced the new direction. She claimed Susan B. Anthony’s legacy by organizing a 
NWP convention in Seneca Falls, on the 75th anniversary of  the one that had marked 
the symbolic beginning of  the woman’s movement.29 There she presented a constitu-
tional amendment of  her own drafting, which was unanimously approved: ‘Men and 
women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every place subject 
to its jurisdiction.’30 There was no safeguard clause and no list of  legislative areas to 
address. The NWP demanded full constitutional equality for women without any limi-
tation or qualification. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) would be introduced in 
Congress for the first time in December 1923.
The national struggle between equal rights feminists and supporters of  protective 
legislation soon spilled into the international women’s rights movement. When, in 
1925, the NWP sought membership in the International Woman Suffrage Alliance 
(IWSA), its application was rejected because of  the opposition of  the NLWV.31 In turn, 
the rejection prompted the resignation from the IWSA of  the Six Point Group, a British 
feminist equal rights organization, led by Lady Margaret Rhondda. Rhondda had been 
already cooperating with the NWP as a member of  its international advisory com-
mittee, created in June 1925. The creation of  the committee was an effect of  the newly 
found enthusiasm of  the NWP for internationalism. Now that the party had a well-
defined post-suffrage strategy, its leadership conceived of  international activities no 
longer as a distraction but, rather, as a path to increased influence and effectiveness. 
In any case, the NWP had internationalism in its pedigree; its uncompromising atti-
tude during the Great War proved that it was ready to put feminism above patriotism 
when it counted.
It was Rhondda who suggested to Paul, in 1926, to start a campaign for an inter-
national equal rights treaty. The NWP leader immediately drafted one, modelled on 
the ERA: ‘For the next decade Paul spent most of  her time outside the US attempting 
to sell the treaty to feminists, the Pan-American Union, the League of  Nations and the 
International Labor Office (ILO).’32 While Paul concentrated on the League of  Nations 
and Europe, Stevens would become the main figure of  the NWP’s equal rights work 
in Latin America and at the Pan-American Union. The NWP had first looked at Latin 
America with interest in the context of  the effort to achieve equal nationality rights 
for women in US law. Indeed, following the enactment of  the 1907 Expatriation Act, 
29 On the historical legacy of  the 1848 convention, including its influence on the 1923 NWP event, see 
L. Tetrault, The Myth of  Seneca Falls: Memory and the Women’s Suffrage Movement, 1848–1898 (2014), at 
181–199.
30 Quoted in Cott, supra note 10, at 59.
31 On the controversy, see Becker, supra note 17, at 166–168.
32 Miller, ‘“Geneva – the Key to Equality”: Inter-war Feminists and the League of  Nations’, 3 Women’s 
History Review (1994) 219, at 221. Expatriation Act 1907, 34 Stat. 1228.
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the citizenship of  every woman in the nation was dependent on the citizenship of  her 
husband.33
After the passage of  the 1922 Cable Act, which had restored independent nation-
ality at least as a default principle, the NWP realized that progress towards equal citi-
zenship was being made.34 Nationality law was an area that promised further success. 
It was also an issue on which equal rights and social feminists managed to find some 
alignment and loose cooperation, at least through the 1920s. Notwithstanding their 
diverging understandings of  the significance of  citizenship for women, both groups 
lobbied to remove the same discriminatory nationality rules.35
A handful of  South and Latin American republics had gone further in terms of  
equal citizenship than the USA had done with the Cable Act or did not have a discrim-
inatory nationality law in the first place.36 By the mid-1920s, this had convinced some 
US feminists that South and Latin American governments might be more willing to 
listen to their arguments than European ones.37 Almost by chance, the NWP would 
beat the NLWV to this advocacy opportunity. A resolution of  the 1923 Pan-American 
Conference, obtained through the lobbying of  Latin American feminists, urged the 
governments of  the continent to follow up on women’s rights issues and include 
women in the official proceedings. Already in 1924, the Brazilian feminist Bertha 
Lutz searched for support in the USA in view of  the next conference in 1928 in Cuba. 
Writing to Carrie Chapman Catt, Lutz urged the NLWV to send representatives: ‘Catt, 
however, thought that the trip to Havana would be too costly and the expense not 
worth the potential outcome, discounting the importance of  Pan American feminism 
and viewing it as secondary in the promotion of  women’s rights on the international 
scene.’38
The NWP would learn about the event much later and respond with an opposite, 
enthusiastic approach. In December 1927, Cuban feminist and lawyer Flora Díaz 
Parrado visited the NWP’s headquarters in Washington, DC, asking the party to join 
Latin American women’s rights activists at the conference. Parrado called on the sis-
terhood and claimed that the participation of  US feminists would give a boost to the 
suffrage struggle in which Cuban women were engaged.39 Jane Norman Smith, the 
33 For historical overviews of  the status of  women under US nationality law, see Bredbenner, supra note 
2; Sapiro,’Women, Citizenship and Nationality: Immigration and Naturalization Policies in the United 
States’, 13 Politics and Society (1984) 1; Cott, ‘Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 
1830–1934’, 103 American Historical Review (1998) 1440.
34 Cable Act 1922, 42 Stat. 1021b.
35 See Bredbenner, supra note 2, at 155–157.
36 See ibid., at 195, 197.
37 See ibid., at 197.
38 Wamsley, ‘Constructing Feminism across Borders: The Pan American Women’s Movement and the 
Founding of  the Inter-American Commission of  Women’, in P. Jonsson, S. Neunsinger and J. Sangster 
(eds), Crossing Boundaries: Women’s Organizing in Europe and the Americas, 1880s–1940s (2007) 51, at 69.
39 On Parrado’s visit and her case to NWP members, see DuBois, ‘A Momentary Transnational Sisterhood: 
Cuban/U.S. Collaboration in the Formation of  the Inter-American Commission of  Women’, in A. Lorini 
(ed.), An Intimate and Contested Relation: The United States and Cuba in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries (2005) 81, at 86–87.
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NWP chairperson at the time, wrote to member Margaret Lambie regretting their 
late discovery: ‘It is such a pity that we did not know about it sooner for it is very im-
portant.’40 Indeed, the event was scheduled to start in the following month of  January. 
Notwithstanding the short timeframe for preparations, the NWP dispatched Smith, 
Muna Lee, Valentine Winters and Doris Stevens to Havana. There, Stevens met the 
influential international lawyer James Brown Scott and introduced him to the Equal 
Rights Treaty they would go on to champion together.
3 The 1928 Havana Conference and the Creation of  the 
Inter-American Commission of Women
The sixth Pan-American Conference took place between 16 January and 20 
February 1928. The women of  the NWP spent their initial efforts in Havana 
lobbying the US delegates, finding them ‘preoccupied with detecting and coun-
tering anti imperialism’.41 It was in the course of  one of  these attempts that 
Stevens met Scott; by 1 February, she had followed up with a letter asking him to 
consider the NWP’s attached proposal for an equal rights treaty and offer his ‘emi-
nent legal opinion’.42
The NWP’s envoys found better fortune with the Cuban delegates. Stevens made 
a good impression on Orestes Ferrara, the Cuban ambassador to the USA. More cru-
cially, she gained the ear of  the president of  the conference, Scott’s friend and as-
sociate Antonio de Bustamante.43 This would be instrumental for the feminists’ 
agenda. Indeed, the governments and the Pan-American Union had not followed up 
on the resolution approved at the previous conference of  1923. There was no space 
in the official programme of  the conference for women’s rights. But, on 7 February, 
Bustamante favoured a motion to add a ‘[p]lenary meeting … with extra-official char-
acter’ to allow ‘the representatives of  the various feminist associations’ to illustrate 
‘their viewpoints on the matter of  civil and political rights for woman’.44 Moreover, 
Bustamante agreed to preside the session, attended by a third of  the conference dele-
gates and a ‘thousand local women’ who ‘poured into the hall, galleries and stairwells 
40 Quoted in Wamsley, supra note 38, at 69.
41 Hill, supra note 2, at 31. On the patronizing attitude shown to Stevens by Charles Evans Hughes, secre-
tary of  state and president of  the American Society of  International Law, see Bredbenner, supra note 2, at 
200–201. On the international legal implications of  the political tensions surrounding the conference, 
see Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual History 1842–1933 (2014), at 343–349.
42 Doris Stevens to James Brown Scott, 1 February 1928, Folder 1, Box 48, James Brown Scott Papers 
(JBS Papers), Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, 
Washington, DC.
43 See Dubois, supra note 39, at 87.
44 ‘Motion – Invitation to Women’s Associations to Present Their Views Relative to the Rights of  Women’, 
Sixth International Conference of  American States, 7 February 1928, cited in James Brown Scott 
(ed.), The International Conferences of  American States, 1889–1928: A  Collection of  the Conventions, 
Recommendations, Resolutions, and Motions adopted by the First Six Conferences of  the American States, and 
Documents Relating to the Organization of  the Conferences (1931) 324, at 324.
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[of] the University’s Aula Magna’ to demonstrate their demand of  suffrage.45 Stevens 
was among the speakers.
On 18 February, the conference followed up on the event by unanimously approving 
the resolution that established the Inter-American Commission of  Women (IACW), 
which was widely considered to be ‘the first inter-governmental body to deal with 
women’s issues’.46 The unofficial, but ever-present, theme of  the conference had been 
the soothing of  Latin American discontent with the hegemonic actions of  the USA. 
At the same time, the US delegation sought to secure and reinforce that hegemony. In 
line with this attitude, the governing board of  the Pan-American Union would shortly 
appoint the most visible feminist representative from the USA, Doris Stevens, as chair-
person of  the new institution. Interestingly, a significant part of  Stevens’ activity in 
her new position would be in direct opposition to her country’s government. The most 
conspicuous instance of  this opposition would regard, indeed, the equal rights treaties 
eventually signed in Montevideo in 1933.
According to later accounts of  the NWP, approved by Scott, he had been ‘stirred by 
Doris Stevens’ appeal for treaty action on women’s rights in the special plenary ses-
sion’. Her speech had been the trigger for his commitment to ‘the abolition of  discrim-
inations based on sex’ and the achievement of  ‘equality by international action’.47 In 
the following months, Scott would be impressed by the legal skills that Stevens and 
Paul had shown in their initial work for the IACW. Beyond their direct experience with 
the lobbying of  legislatures and legislative action, both sought an academic back-
ground in law. Starting her studies in 1922, Paul obtained several degrees. In 1928, 
the American University awarded her a doctorate in civil laws.48 In 1929, Stevens 
began her studies in international law and foreign policy at Columbia University.
The resolution that instituted the commission had tasked it with ‘the prepar-
ation of  juridical information ... to enable the [next] Conference of  American States 
to take up the consideration of  the civil and political equality of  women in the con-
tinent’.49 Stevens and Paul began working on a study of  the legal status of  women 
in the Americas in order to build a case for their equal rights treaties. By July, the 
commission had agreed to focus on nationality issues. Consulting with Scott on the 
topic, they found a common, radical approach that diverged from the mainstream 
45 Dubois, supra note 39, at 89.
46 N. Bercovich, From Motherhood to Citizenship: Women’s Rights and International Citizenship (1999), at 81. 
For Stevens’ account of  the establishment of  the commission and the roles of  Bustamante and Maurtua 
in it, see Doris Stevens to James Brown Scott, 3 February 1929, Folder 1, Box 48, JBS Papers.
47 ‘James Brown Scott’, attached to Edith Houghton Hooker to James Brown Scott, 29 June 1934, Folder 1, 
Box 49, JBS Papers.
48 Nancy Cott has drawn a connection between Paul’s law studies in the 1920s and ‘her aims [being] 
framed … more and more abstractly and legalistically’. Along with this trend, ‘the NWP campaign for 
equal rights devolved into a practice of  exclusiveness and a defense of  the status quo with regard to every-
thing but the gender question. … As a result of  its construction of  the gender imperative, the NWP made 
equal rights an abstract goal, because placing it in the context of  social reality would have required stands 
on social and political issues that affected women but that were not strictly gender questions’. Cott, supra 
note 10, at 65, 67–68.
49 ‘Resolution – Inter-American Commission of  Women’, in Scott, supra note 44, 408.
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of  international lawyers and diplomatic operators. Stevens, Paul and Scott naturally 
began to work together.
This connection came at a crucial moment when several approaches and initia-
tives were jockeying to gain influence in view of  the League of  Nations Codification 
Conference, which was called for 1930. Nationality, alongside territorial waters and 
state responsibility for damages to foreigners, had been chosen as subjects for codifi-
cation at the conference in The Hague. In November 1927, Manley O. Hudson had 
started a preparatory project, known as the Harvard Research in International Law,50 
with the purpose of  researching and drafting treaties on the topics of  the conference. 
Hudson assembled a group of  top-level experts including Edwin Borchard, Richard 
W.  Flournoy, George Wickersham and James Brown Scott. Scott was part of  the 
working group on nationality led by Flournoy. In May 1928, Scott wrote him a letter 
to explain his general views on the subject.51 He was aware that he was proposing 
‘a somewhat drastic method’ to streamline nationality laws worldwide and instate a 
uniform global standard. His formula rested on two basic ideas: first, the adoption of  
ius soli (place of  birth) as the single mode of  acquisition of  nationality at birth, and 
second, the adoption of  nationality rules based on full individual equality.
Indeed, the generalized adoption of  ius soli, with the exclusion of  any other na-
tionality standard besides voluntary naturalization, would lead to ‘the elimination of  
“sex” and derivative nationality ‘from the statute book’. Scott added that ‘the effect of  
this triumph on the part of  womankind – which [he] personally regard[ed] as as de-
sirable as it [was] inevitable’ – would not generate trouble if  parents were of  different 
nationalities under a ius soli regime, while it could under ius sanguinis. In his view, 
independent nationality and ius soli were the combined elements of  the global nation-
ality ‘law of  the future’. The ‘suggestion … that the husband and wife should be of  the 
same nationality … is generally made by the husband, and is a remnant of  the old law. 
The more modern legislation, which permits the wife to retain her nationality is the 
order of  the day, and is inconsistent with former views and practise [sic]’.52
The times, however, were not progressive enough for the Harvard Research to fully 
accept Scott’s proposals. In the months leading to the presentation of  the final draft 
convention on nationality, which was set for April 1929, Scott and Stevens teamed up 
to push for the inclusion of  a full right to independent citizenship for women. Realizing 
they were on the losing side of  the argument, they decided together to publish Scott’s 
letter to Flournoy to seek support.53 The Harvard Research went in a different direc-
tion. Stevens and Scott objected to Article 19 of  the draft convention on nationality,54 
50 For details on the Harvard Research in International Law and its inception, see Kenny, ‘Manley O. Hudson 
and the Harvard Research in International Law 1927–1940’, 11 International Lawyer (1977) 319.
51 James Brown Scott to Richard W. Flournoy Jr., 15 May 1928, Folder 3, Box 12, JBS Papers.
52 James Brown Scott to Richard W. Flournoy Jr., 15 March 1928, Folder 3, Box 12, JBS Papers.
53 See Doris Stevens to James Brown Scott, 19 February 1929, Folder 7, Box 8, JBS Papers. The letter was 
published as James Brown Scott, ‘International Status of  Married Women’, 91 Advocate of  Peace through 
Justice (March 1929) 137. Scott also asked Stevens if  it would have been helpful to enlist the help of  the 
NLWV. She replied negatively, informing Scott that ‘they did not do Pan American work as we did, … they 
did not confine themselves to feminist work as we did’. Quoted in Bredbenner, supra note 2, at 205.
54 See James Brown Scott to Doris Stevens, 26 February 1929, Folder 6, Box 48, JBS Papers.
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which read: ‘A woman who marries an alien shall, in the absence of  a contrary elec-
tion on her part, retain the nationality which she possessed before marriage.’55 While 
more progressive than the law in force in most countries, this article still provided for 
an exception to independent nationality, which put women in the position to renounce 
their nationality in consequence of  a momentary, possibly impulsive, decision.
On 27 May, Stevens informed Scott that she had decided to form a Committee on 
Nationality under the IACW, headed by Paul, as an alternative to the one set up by the 
Harvard Research.56 Scott approved and applauded the initiative.57 After all, Stevens 
had already proven that her skills could compare with those of  the Harvard experts; 
she had pointed out several errors of  translation in a collection of  nationality laws 
prepared by Hudson and Flournoy, just in time for it to be revised before being pub-
lished by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.58 Scott motivated Stevens 
further in the pursuit of  equal rights through treaties by pointing out the domestic ad-
vantages of  this international route.59 Scott pointed to constitutional history and US 
Supreme Court case law to argue that civil and political rights fell within the treaty-
making power of  the USA.60 An international equal rights treaty would represent the 
law of  the land, leaving no constitutional recourse to states after its ratification in the 
Senate. At the end of  the day, it would have the same effect as an equal rights consti-
tutional amendment.61
4 Unprogressive Codification of  Nationality at The Hague
Doris Stevens was determined to get to the Hague Codification Conference as prepared 
as possible. She spent the summer of  1929 in Europe, consulting and strategizing with 
feminist leaders, including Margaret Rhondda and Chrystal Macmillan, and discussing 
55 Harvard Research in International Law, Harvard Law School, ‘Nationality, Responsibility of  States, 
Territorial Waters: Draft of  Conventions Prepared in Anticipation of  the First Conference on the 
Codification of  International Law, The Hague, 1930’, 23 AJIL, Special Supplement (April 1929) 3, at 16.
56 See Doris Stevens to James Brown Scott, 27 May 1929, Folder 1, Box 48, JBS Papers; see also Bredbenner, 
supra note 2, at 204.
57 See James Brown Scott to Doris Stevens, 29 May 1929, Folder 6, Box 48, JBS Papers.
58 See Richard W. Flournoy Jr. to James Brown Scott, 24 April 1929, Folder 1, Box 48, JBS Papers; James 
Brown Scott to Doris Stevens, 26 April 1929, Vol. 314, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Papers (CEIP Papers), Rare Books and Manuscripts Collections, Butler Library, Columbia University, New 
York. The book was eventually published as R.W. Flournoy Jr. and M.O. Hudson (eds), A Collection of  
Nationality Laws of  Various Countries as Contained in Constitutions, Statutes and Treaties (1929).
59 See especially the correspondence between Scott and Stevens over the spring and summer of  1929 in 
Folder 6, Box 48, JBS Papers.
60 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 US 416 (1920). Another judgment Scott considered a key foundation for his 
interpretation was People v. Gerke, decided by the Supreme Court of  California in 1855 (5 Cal. 381).
61 Scott would develop the full argument in his 1934 American Society of  International Law presidential 
address, with explicit reference to the effects of  the possible ratification of  the 1933 Montevideo equal 
rights treaty. See Scott, ‘Treaty-Making under the Authority of  the United States’, 28 ASIL Proceedings 
(1934) 2. George Finch, Scott’s right-hand man, would later criticize the trend of  enlarging the scope 
of  the treaty-making power and pointed to the campaign for the equal rights treaty at the 1928 Pan-
American Conference as its beginning. See Finch, ‘The Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of  the 
United States within Constitutional Limits’, 57 AJIL (1954) 62.
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the merits of  equal nationality at public events.62 She also campaigned for the appoint-
ment of  women as delegates for the conference.63 In the meantime, the IACW’s re-
search on nationality laws proceeded well in the USA under the direction of  Paul. Scott 
continued offering his help in providing resources and expertise.64 He had also made 
possible the organization of  the first conference of  the IACW, which was to be held in 
February 1930 as preparation for the Hague conference, which would begin in March. 
Stevens had first contacted the State Department, asking for support to organize the 
event in Washington, DC, but it had refused.65 Scott alerted his Cuban contacts and 
vouched for the official status of  the IACW with the Cuban government, a status that 
had been put in doubt by the director of  the Pan-American Union, Leo Rowe.66
The presentation of  the report of  the Committee on Nationality was the highlight 
of  the IACW gathering in Havana.67 It analysed the nationality laws of  84 countries 
and recommended the adoption of  an equal nationality treaty as an end to discrimin-
ation against women in matters of  citizenship.68 In praising the volume, Scott did not 
miss the chance to remark how more precise and complete it was than the one pre-
pared by the Harvard Research: ‘[T]he documents contained in the treatises prepared 
by our masculine experts are full of  incredible errors, which have been corrected by 
feminine industry and exactitude.’ This achievement was further proof  of  the ‘faith’ 
Scott already had ‘in the capacity of  woman’. It was time for women to participate dir-
ectly in determining the nationality laws that affected them. Therefore, Scott renewed 
the request to the ‘[g]overnments of  all the Americas [to] appoint women delegates to 
take part in the Conference of  The Hague [so] that equality may be introduced into the 
world’.69 The IACW issued a more specific resolution, asking the president of  the USA 
to appoint Doris Stevens as a plenipotentiary for the Hague Codification Conference.70
The selection of  the delegations represented an early sign that the Hague conference 
would not be successful for women’s rights organizations. Only two women – one from 
Germany, Marie Elisabeth Lüders, and the other from the USA – were appointed as full 
delegates. The US delegate, Ruth B. Shipley, head of  the Passport Division of  the State 
Department, was not connected to the women’s rights movement.71 President Herbert 
62 See Lee, ‘The Inter-American Commission of  Women: A  New International Venture’, Pan-American 
Magazine, October 1929, reprinted in Jonathan Cohen (ed.), A Pan-American Life: Selected Poetry and Prose 
of  Muna Lee (2004) 223.
63 See Bredbenner, supra note 2, at 202–203.
64 See, e.g., ‘Resolution – Tribute to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’, First Conference of  
the Inter-American Commission of  Women, 24 February 1930, reprinted in Scott, supra note 44, at 505.
65 See Francis White to Doris Stevens, 8 March 1929, Folder 6, Box 48, JBS Papers.
66 See the correspondence between James Brown Scott and Doris Stevens in Folder 6, Box 48, JBS Papers.
67 For the programme of  the conference and the resolutions it approved, see Scott, supra note 44, at 500–
506. A later copy of  the report, revised for the 1933 Montevideo Conference, can be found in Folder 5, 
Box 49, JBS Papers.
68 See Hill, supra note 2, at 129–132.
69 J.B. Scott, Observations on Nationality (1931), at 95–96.
70 See Scott, supra note 44, at 503.
71 Historian Ellen DuBois has called Shipley an ‘antifeminist’. See DuBois, ‘Storming The Hague: the 
1930 Campaign for Independent Nationality for Women Regardless of  Marital Status’, 4 Tijdschrift voor 
Genderstudies (2003) 18, at 20. Somehow contradicting Dubois’ assessment is the circumstance that Shipley 
proposed to the conference – a resolution for the further study of  equal nationality (see, e.g., D.H. Miller, 
‘The Hague Codification Conference’, 24 American Journal of  International Law (1930) 674, at 682–683).
428 EJIL 30 (2019), 415–437
Hoover, though, did appoint a NWP member for a minor position in the delegation; 
Emma Wold would act as a technical advisor at the conference. These two appoint-
ments occurred against the advice of  Manley Hudson, who ‘had made it clear’ to the 
administration ‘that he did not want women to be officially part of  the delegation’.72
Once the conference opened on 13 March, it soon became clear that there was no 
space for an agreement on territorial waters and state responsibility. Therefore, the 
stakes to achieve any kind of  compromise on nationality became higher; the League 
of  Nations and the participating governments could not afford to close the conference 
without a treaty to show for it. The delegate of  Chile, Miguel Cruchaga, introduced 
Paul’s Equal Nationality Treaty as a resolution on behalf  of  the NWP and the IACW. It 
was quickly defeated. After that, the goal of  the women’s rights activists at The Hague 
was to make sure that the conference would not crystallize and reaffirm the principle 
of  derivative citizenship for women in international law. The officers of  the conference 
did not make their job easy. The president of  the conference, Theodorus Heemskerk, 
barred them from the Peace Palace, making it impossible for them to lobby the delega-
tions at the event’s venue.73 The one exception was Nicolas Politis, who, in his capacity 
as chairperson of  the Committee on Nationality, gave the women activists a chance 
to be heard, ‘merely [as] an act of  courtesy’.74 In her speech at the hearing, held on 
1 April, Stevens made public that many delegates had already told her that she could 
not change their minds. Defiantly, she reminded them that they had no merit for the 
privilege and power they held: it was ‘a mere accident that we were born women and 
you were born men’.75
The draft convention that emerged out of  the conference’s discussions accepted and 
assumed the principle of  the dependent nationality of  married women; it only sought 
to coordinate different national laws so that their combination would not determine 
cases of  statelessness as a result of  marriage. For instance, article 8 of  the convention 
prescribed that, ‘[i]f  the national law of  the wife causes her to lose her nationality on 
marriage with a foreigner, this consequence shall be conditional on her acquiring the 
nationality of  the husband’.76 Scott would argue later in the year that a much simpler 
way to avoid statelessness, and guarantee equality at the same time, would have been 
72 Bredbenner, supra note 2, at 206–207.
73 See, ibid., at 210. Scott had sent Heemskerk an introduction of  Stevens and her activities, which appar-
ently failed to gain his benevolence. See James Brown Scott to Theodorus Heemskerk, 17 March 1930, 
Folder 8, Box 12, JBS Papers.
74 Quoted in Bredbenner, supra note 2, at 211.
75 See ibid. At the opening of  the conference, Scott sent a cable to Politis introducing Stevens and telling him 
that he hoped for ‘the adoption of  [the] equality resolution or nothing’ with regard to the ‘nationality [of] 
women’. James Brown Scott to Nicolas Politis, 7 March 1930, Folder 8, Box 12, JBS Papers. On 11 April, 
Politis replied that, given ‘the ultraconservative spirit … in this Conference’, what had been ‘obtained’ – 
for instance Art. 9, which allowed married women to retain their nationality in case of  naturalization of  
the husband during marriage – was ‘the maximum that could be reached’. Nicolas Politis to James Brown 
Scott, 1 April 1930, Folder 6, Box 6, JBS Papers.
76 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of  Nationality Laws (Convention on Certain 
Questions), reprinted in ‘Conference for the Codification of  International Law – Final Act’, 24 AJIL, 
Supplement (1930) 192, at 193.
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to leave ‘woman’s nationality … not affected by marriage’, a principle already accepted 
in a constantly growing number of  national legal systems.77 On 4 April, Stevens sent 
a cable to Paul in Washington, DC, informing her that the convention on nationality 
would pass: ‘The leaders are agitated over our pressure but we have lost.’78 Still, she 
suggested her a course of  action. There were still goals to achieve by lobbing the US 
government and Congress. That was the reason why Paul had stayed back. She had 
started ‘by canvassing senators tirelessly’, making sure that, even if  the administra-
tion eventually signed the convention, there would be no majority for ratification.79
As it turned out, the US government was already sceptical of  the opportunity of  regu-
lating nationality through international law, but it did not advertise this position for dip-
lomatic reasons. Leaving open the possibility of  accession to an equal nationality treaty 
allowed the USA to participate in the negotiations and influence the drafting process.80 
Once the final draft was set, the US delegation had more than one reason to be unhappy 
with it. It was not only incompatible with the Cable Act, but it also forbade expatriation 
unless the person already possessed, or would receive as a consequence, another nation-
ality.81 This was a sensitive point for the USA, which was not ready to give up the unfet-
tered possibility of  depriving of  nationality those citizens who had left the country for 
good. The administration preferred not to advertise this position either, as it was a possible 
source of  tension with immigrant communities and their countries of  origin.82 Therefore, 
the issue of  independent nationality became the point of  contention that the US govern-
ment highlighted the most among its several perplexities about the convention.83
The USA could have signed the convention with significant reservations as many 
other countries did, but the NWP and its allies mounted a relentless campaign for 
the government to take a stand and vote against it. Scott did his part. Throughout the 
duration of  the conference, he had repeatedly made his case for equal nationality and 
explained the dangers of  a discriminatory convention in letters to State Department 
officials,84 US senators,85 Latin American diplomats86 and delegations at The Hague.87 
77 Scott, ‘Unprogressive Codification of  Nationality at The Hague’, 18 Women Lawyers’ Journal (1930) 38, 
at 39.
78 Doris Stevens to Alice Paul, 4 April 1930, Folder 8, Box 7, JBS Papers.
79 Bredbenner, supra note 2, at 210.
80 See ibid., at 207–208.
81 See Convention on Certain Questions, supra note 76, at 193.
82 See Bredbenner, supra note 2, at 211–212.
83 It is to be noted that after the negative vote of  the USA to the convention, Acting Secretary of  State 
Joseph Cotton released a statement offering expatriation and equality as equivalent motivations, both 
being ‘principles … firmly embedded in our law’ (quoted in ibid., at 214). This was possibly an attempt to 
counteract the criticism levelled at the administration for having its hand forced by what Cotton called 
the ‘feminine lobby’. For instance, Manley Hudson would later affirm that the government was ‘more in-
tent upon mollifying a section of  its own public opinion than upon grappling with the very real problems 
which exist today and which the convention is designed to solve’. Hudson, ‘The Hague Convention of  
1930 and the Nationality of  Women’, 27 AJIL (1933) 117, at 122.
84 See, e.g., James Brown Scott to Wilbur Carr, circa April 1930, Folder 8, Box 12, JBS Paper.
85 See, e.g., James Brown Scott to Claude A. Swanson, 4 April 1930, and James Brown Scott to William 
E. Borah, 7 April 1930, Folder 9, Box 12, JBS Papers.
86 See, e.g., James Brown Scott to Tirso Mesa, 8 April 1930, Folder 9, Box 12, JBS Papers.
87 See, e.g., James Brown Scott to Miguel Cruchaga, 7 April 1930, Folder 9, Box 12, JBS Papers.
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On the day of  the final vote, Scott, John Cable and representatives of  the NWP and the 
National Association of  Women Lawyers went to the White House for a final appeal to 
President Hoover.88 Doris Stevens described the decisive moment: ‘There was exhilar-
ation in the air. … The nationality convention was … the only document to come out 
of  the conference. All of  a sudden David Hunter Miller, head of  the US delegation went 
to the platform and announced that the USA would not sign.’89 This would be the only 
dissenting vote; the other 40 countries would all sign the convention. Yet the isolated 
stand of  the USA allowed the NWP to spin a triumphant narrative out of  what was 
an ostensible setback for equal nationality. Less than two weeks after the vote, Anna 
Kelton Wiley, chairperson of  the NWP, put into words this interpretation of  the events 
of  the conference in a letter to Scott:
Instead of  the final outcome at The Hague being a defeat, it is really a moral victory. ‘Forty to 
One’ will become a by-word for the feminists of  the United States. It makes one think of  the Pass 
of  the Thermopylae with the United States playing the role of  Leonidas, with this difference. 
The dying courage of  Leonidas stirred all Greece; the living courage of  the United States at The 
Hague, we hope, will stir the world from its ancient prejudice against women.90
The step from moral victory to moral superiority of  the new world over old Europe 
was short. Alva Belmont, the NWP’s main financial backer, depicted Europeans 
hanging on to ‘the old world subjection of  women’ as the last remnant of  their dis-
appearing ancien régime: ‘These men have lost their slaves. They have lost their serfs. 
They have lost their dominion over the working class. They still think they can dom-
inate women. It terrifies them to think that in the future women mean to govern 
themselves[.]’91 Conveniently overlooking the fact that the Latin American govern-
ments had signed the convention, Scott wrote of  a ‘Western Continent, conceived 
in liberty, … insist[ing] upon equality in law’.92 The narrative of  moral superiority 
prompted ‘a surge of  home support for the rejection of  the convention’, which, in 
turn, helped to spur Congress into action and remove two of  the provisions of  the 
Cable Act still inspired by dependent citizenship. In 1930, the clause expatriating 
women married to foreigners and residing abroad was repealed. In 1931, barring 
from citizenship women married to aliens who were ineligible for naturalization was 
the next clause to disappear from the books.93
The events of  The Hague also spurred further international initiatives by Stevens, 
Paul and Scott. Paul moved to Geneva to follow up and maintain pressure on the 
League of  Nations. Initially, she relied on a recommendation that Ruth Shipley of  the 
US delegation had introduced at the Hague Codification Conference, calling for the 
88 See Bredbenner, supra note 2, at 213; Finch, ‘Equal Rights for Women’, unpublished text meant for James 
Brown Scott’s biography, Folder 3, Box 69, at 19, JBS Papers.
89 Quoted in DuBois, supra note 71, at 23–24. For Miller’s own account of  the conference, see Miller, supra 
note 71.
90 Anna Kelton Wiley to James Brown Scott, 23 April 1930, Folder 2, Box 9, JBS Papers.
91 Quoted in Bredbenner, supra note 2, at 215.
92 Scott, ‘Nationality’, 24 AJIL (1930) 556, at 560.
93 See Bredbenner, supra note 2, at 215.
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further ‘study of  … the principle of  equality of  sexes in matters of  nationality’.94 The 
joint action of  women’s rights activist groups led to the establishment, in 1931, of  a 
Women’s Consultative Committee on Nationality to support the League of  Nations in 
that further examination. The committee took several initiatives to reopen the discus-
sion, but ‘[m]ost of  the governments opposed any fresh examination of  the matter’.95 
The best that could be achieved was an Assembly resolution in 1932, which simply 
affirmed ‘that the coming into force of  Articles 8 to 11’ – the ones in the convention 
dealing with the nationality of  married women – ‘would in no way prejudice further 
concerted international action [and] place any restriction upon … any state that may 
desire to give further effect in its nationality laws to the principle of  the equality of  the 
sexes’.96
The effectiveness of  the Women’s Consultative Committee on Nationality was not 
only marred by the opposition of  governments but also by its own internal disagree-
ments, which were exacerbated when Paul sought to expand its purview beyond na-
tionality issues to the general legal status of  women. Indeed, if  a shaky alignment 
could be found around independent citizenship, equal rights and social feminists 
could find no other common position. The committee’s lack of  unity made it incapable 
of  exerting any significant influence in a campaign that was anyway waged against 
difficult odds.97
5 Victory at Montevideo: The Stevens Treaties
The defeat of  The Hague provided Stevens and Scott with an opportunity to start a 
deeper discussion with Latin American governments over equal nationality. Latin 
American states had signed the convention on nationality at the Hague Codification 
Conference, but it was not too late to prevent them from ratifying it. The two proceeded 
with a concerted action. In July 1930, Stevens, in her capacity as chairperson of  the 
IACW, sent a communication to the ministers of  foreign affairs of  all state members 
of  the Pan-American Union. The main item was a questionnaire on their respective 
legal systems. Its function was to gather information for further studies on the legal 
status of  women that the commission was undertaking in view of  the following Pan-
American Conference. Stevens suggested that ‘the Ministers refrain from action’ in the 
meantime; the fact that the Hague Codification Conference itself  had recommended 
additional study on the nationality of  married women called for prudence.98
Scott contributed by cultivating his vast network in the foreign policy establishment 
of  the American continent. As soon as rumours emerged that a country was taking 
94 ‘Conference for the Codification of  International Law’, supra note 76, at 229.
95 Hudson, supra note 83, at 119. On the detail of  those initiatives, see ibid., at 118–120.
96 The resolution is reproduced in ibid., at 119–120.
97 On the Women’s Consultative Committee and its internal divisions, see, e.g., Miller, supra note 71, at 
227–232; L.J. Rupp, Worlds of  Women: The Making of  an International Women’s Movement (1997), at 41, 
147–148.
98 James Brown Scott to Doris Stevens, 2 July 1930, Folder 12, Box 12, JBS Papers.
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preliminary steps towards ratification, he intervened with opposing arguments. 
Beyond educating his correspondents on the diplomatic and legal issues involved,99 
Scott kept reminding them of  the responsibility of  the Americas’ moral and progres-
sive leadership. As he explained to the Cuban secretary of  state, for instance:
The Western World … is breaking down barriers which have separated classes and it has begun 
the process of  according to individuals, as such, equal rights, equal duties and equal privileges. 
I ask if  Cuba would not confess its faith in … equal right, to the extent of  withholding its ap-
proval of  the Convention on Nationality and refraining from submitting the Convention to the 
Republic for its ratification.100
Scott also proceeded to align the positions of  the American Institute of  International 
Law, which he directed, with those of  the IACW. In October 1931, the Governing 
Board of  the institute named Stevens as its first woman member. In the same session, 
the board also recommended for approval at Montevideo an equal rights treaty and 
an equal nationality treaty. Both had a single substantial article. The former, which 
adopted the language that Paul had devised for the ERA, provided that in the ‘jurisdic-
tion’ of  ‘Contracting States … men and women shall have equal rights throughout the 
territory’. With the latter, ‘the Contracting Parties agree[d] there shall be no distinc-
tion based on sex in their law and practice relating to nationality’.101 In view of  the 
Montevideo conference, Stevens was also named the institute’s rapporteur on the civil 
and political equality of  men and women.102
On 4 November 1933, Scott spoke before the convention of  the NWP on the pro-
spective ‘adoption … by the Conference at Montevideo’, which was to take place the 
following month, of  ‘these two epoch-making projects’. He showed faith in the women 
of  the IACW to obtain their approval, which ‘would … dedicate the Republics of  the 
vast American continent to equality as they are already dedicated to liberty’. He closed 
his speech with a plea to ‘God’ to ‘bless the American women’ who would soon ‘join 
battle far, far to the south at Montevideo under the light of  the Southern Cross’.103 
A few days later, Scott sent a letter to the secretary of  state, Cordell Hull, appointed 
to the position by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who had assumed the US presidency 
earlier in the year and had been Scott’s student at Columbia Law School. Scott’s letter, 
which was over 40 pages long, sought to enlighten Hull on his positions on every topic 
99 See, e.g., the memorandum sent to the Mexican ambassador to the USA, 14 April 1930, Folder 14, and 
the correspondence with Brazilian diplomats and the US ambassador in Brazil, Folder 17, October and 
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American ministers of  foreign affairs in the summer of  1931 as president of  the American Institute of  
International Law. See ‘Second Letter to Ministers of  Foreign Affairs – Draft’, 10 June 1931, Folder 4, Box 
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100 James Brown Scott to Rafael Martínez Ortíz, 27 June 1930, Folder 11, Box 12, JBS Papers.
101 See Lee, ‘Equal Rights Approved by American Institute of  International Law’, Equal Rights, 28 
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102 See, e.g., James Brown Scott to Doris Stevens, 7 November 1933, and James Brown Scott to Victor 
Maurtua, 10 November 1933, Vol. 332, CEIP Papers.
103 Scott, ‘The Inter-American Commission of  Women Reports at Montevideo – Address before the Biennial 
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to be addressed by the upcoming conference. With regard to ‘the political and civil 
rights of  women’, Scott retraced for Hull the events and the steps forward of  recent 
years, ranging from the initiatives within the pan-American machinery to the League 
of  Nations and the Institut de droit international. As he suggested, the secretary of  
state could contribute to an ‘immense victory of  right over inequality’; he just had to 
instruct ‘the Chairman of  the American Delegation’ at Montevideo to ‘advocate the 
acceptance of  six lines, three on equal rights and three on equal nationality in the 
projects to be presented by Miss Stevens’.104
Not surprisingly, though, the USA’s delegation initially opposed both recommenda-
tions. The Equal Rights Treaty was perceived – correctly – as an attempt by the NWP to 
force the hand of  national institutions towards the ERA. With regard to equal nation-
ality, what Paul considered a reversal of  the US policy at The Hague was really not; the 
State Department had consistently preferred not to be bound in matters of  nationality 
by a treaty, whatever its approach and content.105 The USA brought a woman delegate 
to Montevideo, Sophonisba Breckinridge. She would join the battle but on the opposite 
side of  Stevens and the NWP. Breckinridge, a professor at the University of  Chicago 
who had published extensively on the social, legal and economic condition of  women 
in the USA, took the floor before the Third Committee of  the conference, tasked with 
addressing the civil and political rights of  women. She explained in detail why she, 
the government she represented and ‘several groups of  organized women’, including 
the League of  Women Voters, considered the initiatives of  equal rights feminists mis-
guided. Her comments mirrored the intersectional perspective of  class and gender, 
which, as we have seen in the second section of  this article, the NWP had quashed 
within its fold in the early 1920s to pursue the radical egalitarian approach favoured 
by its white, middle- and upper-class leaders:
[W]hile equality should enter into the solution as a guiding principle, it is not enough since equality 
may be obtained by selecting the less advantageous situation[. T]here are two groups of  women, 
whose interests apparently in conflict are, in fact, identical[.] The woman of  general professional 
attainments who feels the irksome restrictions imposed sometimes by law, sometimes by prejudice, 
needs and desires emancipation from those restrictions. While no treaty of  equality will persuade 
a client or a patient to employ a woman rather than a man, it is not unnatural that such women 
might think to find assistance in some such device. On the other hand, the women at the bottom 
of  the occupational ladder, weak bargainers, … find almost the only basis of  effective equality in 
such protection from undue exploitation as is provided by legislation restricting hours, prohibiting 
night work, prescribing conditions of  safety and decency in work places[.]106
The proposal for an equal rights treaty was declined. The conference resolved that it 
could not ‘impose’ such blanket ‘binding obligations … without curtailing the sov-
ereign rights of  the different States’.107 Nevertheless, the delegations of  four states – 
Cuba, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay – decided to sign the treaty.108
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The Equal Nationality Treaty received much wider support. Several countries had 
announced that they would sign it before the conference opened. After all, Latin 
American governments could make this gesture of  goodwill towards feminist causes 
at no cost, as their legal systems already generally enshrined the principle of  equal na-
tionality. The USA would eventually change its course and join them. Once the inten-
tion of  the government not to sign became public knowledge during the opening days 
of  the conference, supporters of  the treaty mounted a vehement campaign of  protest. 
The only women’s organization that supported the administration in this phase was 
the NLWV. Even though they promoted and campaigned for independent citizenship, 
‘the NLWV’s leaders were too distracted by the obvious textual similarities between 
the nationality treaty and the … equal rights amendment to assess the merits of  the 
nationality treaty independently. [It] had to be arrested because it could serve as the 
means towards … the abolition of  all laws based on sex’.109
The NLWV remained isolated in its position. The protest went beyond feminists and 
reformers, receiving support from most of  the nation’s press. Indeed, the general per-
ception was that not signing in Montevideo was not a consistent continuation of  the 
US policy at The Hague; rather, it was a betrayal of  the spirit of  that earlier decision 
that took a stand for women’s rights.110 Beyond public pressure, there were other cir-
cumstances that favoured reconsideration by the administration. Refusing to sign a 
treaty that was so strongly supported by Latin American countries did not fit with the 
‘good neighbour’ policy to which Roosevelt had committed. Moreover, the USA also 
had little to lose in terms of  new obligations; the Cable Act, with its recent modifica-
tions, already prescribed full equality in almost every aspect of  domestic nationality 
law. Notwithstanding the objections of  the State Department, Roosevelt instructed 
the delegation to switch its position. On 26 December 1933, 19 American countries, 
including the USA, signed the Equal Nationality Treaty.111
The NWP celebrated the outcome of  the Montevideo conference as a turning point 
in history.112 Anna Kelton Wiley affirmed that Paul, Stevens and Scott were among 
the ‘few mortals … given the great joy of  victory due to their own labors’ and deserv-
ing ‘the gratitude of  hosts of  people’. She also expressed her own personal gratitude 
to Scott: ‘Our two leaders are quite peerless in this great triumph but without your 
great knowledge, great sympathy and great personality this event could not have 
taken place.’113 Scott, instead, placed the credit for the equality conventions entirely 
somewhere else by coining them the Stevens Treaties.114 He opened his account of  the 
Montevideo conference in the American Journal of  International Law by analysing those 
two documents and commenting on their importance:
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At Montevideo there was established a great and illuminating precedent. In achieving equality 
by international agreement, our American women, whether consciously or not, have given to 
the future law of  nations its inevitable and enduring direction; and the future law of  nations 
will it not be the result of  the collaboration of  enlightened men and women?115
The triumph of  Montevideo would be completed on 24 May 1934. On that day, 
the US Senate ratified the Equal Nationality Treaty, and President Roosevelt signed 
into law the Dickstein-Copeland bill, originally drafted by Alice Paul.116 In conse-
quence of  its enactment, all rules in US nationality law applied equally to women 
and men.
6 Concluding Remarks
The success that the NWP leaders achieved in 1933 and 1934 came when their pos-
ition of  international influence was already in jeopardy. In January 1933, all NWP-
led activities, including the IACW, had lost their main source of  financial support 
with the death of  Alva Belmont, who had bankrolled the party since its foundation. 
Also, the limited funding that Scott had been able to provide for the IACW’s legal 
reports through the Division of  International Law of  the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace came to an end. The trustees had initially indulged Scott’s ven-
ture into feminist activism. They ‘decided to discontinue the Endowment’s financial 
support’ when Scott gave the cause ‘what they considered undue importance and 
prominence’.117
In addition, the IACW’s position within the pan-American system came under 
attack at Montevideo. The commission was confirmed by the conference, despite a 
US-led attempt to secure its suppression.118 The primary goal of  the Roosevelt admin-
istration was not to get rid of  the commission in and for itself  but, rather, to get rid 
of  Stevens. Indeed, the leading women in the administration were social feminists 
who supported protective legislation. Among them were figures like Frances Perkins, 
secretary of  labour and the first woman to be appointed to the US Cabinet, and the 
First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, whose ‘disagreements with the NWP were public know-
ledge’.119 The growing opposition to Stevens’ leadership among Latin American fem-
inists facilitated the moves against her.120 At the following Pan-American Conference, 
held in Lima in 1938, the IACW was reformed, allowing the USA to appoint a new 
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representative. On 1 February 1939, Mary Winslow of  the Women’s Trade Union 
League, a social feminist, was chosen to replace Stevens.121
Shortly after this event, Stevens and Paul fell out with each other, prompting a fur-
ther reduction of  membership and influence for the NWP. In the following decades, 
they continued their feminist advocacy separately, taking up the role of  noble fore-
mothers for younger newcomers to the cause. Their activity would remain confined 
within the national discourse, without further ventures into international politics. 
Their declining influence can be explained, at least in part, by their unwillingness to 
take on board the instances of  the larger feminist movement and their increasingly 
authoritarian leadership style. As Sophonisba Breckinridge explained with clarity 
at Montevideo, the NWP’s credo that women would achieve social equality through 
blanket equal rights legislation was widely contested, not just in the political discourse 
at large but also among women and feminist activists.
The Equal Nationality Treaty at least responded – in spirit, but not in method – to 
an aspiration shared within the women’s rights movement. The Equal Rights Treaty, 
instead, was perceived as the attempt of  elitist upper-class professionals to gain further 
privileges at the expense of  working-class and non-white women, whose plight they 
seemed oblivious or indifferent to. Moreover, the decision to start an international 
equal rights campaign came from the very top of  the NWP, without any semblance of  
democratic or open consultation. Paul and Stevens pursued it in their own terms, run-
ning, respectively, the Women’s Consultative Committee on Nationality and the IACW 
as independently as they could. Looking at it from this point of  view, the campaign for 
the two Montevideo treaties appears as the self-referential action of  a restricted elitist 
group rather than a popular quest for universal justice. Yet it was also the impressive 
effort of  activists who dedicated their lives to improve the social conditions of  women 
and managed, alongside many other friendly and competing groups, to put the equal 
rights of  women on the agenda of  international politics for the first time.
Whatever their shortcomings, the work of  Paul and Stevens within international 
institutions in the interwar years remains an impressive feat of  legal skills and political 
savvy. Fighting against prejudice, Paul, Stevens and many other women managed to 
get their voices heard and leave their mark in the development of  international law. 
Their story shows that women’s contribution to the discipline in that seminal period 
can be studied and recovered if  we only look in the right place. True, besides a handful 
of  exceptions, women were excluded from international law, academic chairs, diplo-
matic service and the higher-level staff  of  international institutions. If  we limit our 
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purview to those roles, it is easy to conclude that, when it comes to interwar inter-
national law, women were simply not there. But activists pursuing peaceful global re-
lations or women’s rights in various forms powered through, garnering influence and 
achieving political and legislative results in international fora. It is time to tell their 
stories and restore them to their rightful place in the history of  our discipline.
